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A note on the immaterial singularity of business investment in France from 26 October 2018 
highlighted the significant scale of investment in intangible assets by companies in France. In 
comparison with its partners, who are similar in terms of productive specialization, the French 
economy invests relatively more in Research and Development, software, databases and other 
types of intellectual property. Looking at gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) excluding 
construction, the share of intangible investment reached 53% in 2015, compared to 45% in the 
United Kingdom, 41% in the United States, 32% in Germany and 29% in Italy and Spain. 
These results are corroborated by statistics that evaluate other dimensions (INTAN basis), outside 
the national accounts, of intangible investments, such as those in organization, training and 
marketing. France is not lagging behind its partners in this type of asset either (see Guillou, 
Lallement and Mini, 2018). 
As for the national accounts, these include two main intangible assets: R&D expenditure and 
expenditure on software and databases. In terms of R&D, French investment performance is 
consistent with the technological level and structure of its production specialization. If the French 
economy had a larger manufacturing sector, its spending on R&D would be much larger. What is 
less coherent is the extent and intensity of investment in software and databases, to such an 
extent that one cannot help but wonder whether this immaterial dimension of investment is almost 
unreal. 
Figure 1 illustrates that “Software and databases” investment is larger in France than in the rest of 
the European countries. The share is, however, close to the levels observed in the United Kingdom 
and the United States. Of course, this share reflects the weakness of other targets for investment 
such as machinery and equipment specific to the manufacturing sector (see the earlier note on 
investment). 
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In terms of the rate of investment, that is to say, investment expenditure as a ratio of value added 
of the market economy, the dynamism of the French economy in terms of software and databases 
is confirmed: France clearly outdistances its partners. 
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This also raises questions because it reveals a gap of 2 percentage points of the VA relative to the 
United States and 3 points relative to Germany. French companies invested 33 billion euros more 
in software and database than did German companies in 2015. Note that in 2015 total GFCF 
excluding construction was 285 billion euros in Germany and 197 billion in France. Moreover, the 
gap in the investment rate across all types of assets in France was 4 percentage points vis-à-vis 
Germany (see Guillou, 2018, page 20). 
This gap can be explained only under the conditions, 1) that the production function of the French 
economy uses more software and databases than its partners, or 2) that the GFCF software and 
databases item is either artificially valued in relation to the current practices of France’s partners, 
which may be the case, or because the value of the software asset is more important in France 
(companies may choose to put spending on software in current spending), either because the asset 
value is greater (which is possible because part of this value, that of software produced in-house, is 
up to the discretion of the companies). 
Understanding this gap is of considerable importance, because it is decisive for making a 
diagnosis of the state of French corporate investment and the state of its digitization (see 
Gaglio and Guillou, 2018). The aggregate macroeconomic value of GFCF includes GFCF in software; 
if this is overestimated, it has implications for the macroeconomic balance and the contribution of 
GFCF to growth. The measurement of total factor productivity would also be affected, as the 
overestimation of capital (fuelled by investment) would lead to underestimating residual technical 
progress. So not only would the investment effort of French companies be overestimated, but the 
diagnosis of the nature of growth would also be off. 
But there are reasons to question how real this gap is. In other words, shouldn’t the 
immateriality of GFCF be viewed as a flaw in reality? 
On the one hand, it is not clear that France’s productive specialization justifies such overinvestment 
in software and databases. For example, the comparison with Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
the United States and Spain shows specialization that is relatively close, with the exception of the 
manufacturing sector, which has a much greater presence in Germany. The share of the 
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“Information and Communication” sector in which digital services are located correlates well with 
GFCF in software, but this sector is not significantly more present in France. It represents 6.5% of 
the value added of the market economy, compared to 6% in Germany and 8% in the United 
Kingdom (see Guillou, 2018, page 30). 
On the other hand, the data from the input-output tables on consumption by branch of goods and 
services coming from the digital publishing sector (58) – a sector that concentrates the production 
of software – do not corroborate French superiority. The following graphs show that, whether 
considering domestic consumption (Figure 3) or imported (Figure 4), intermediaries’ consumption 
of digital services in France does not confirm the French domination recorded for GFCF in software 
and databases. On the contrary, these two graphs show that the French economy’s consumption of 
inputs from the digital publishing sector is not especially high and even that domestic consumption 
has fallen. 
While the overlap between “software and databases” on the one hand and “digital publishing 
services” on the other is not perfect, there should not be a contradiction between the trends or the 
hierarchies between countries – unless software expenditure consists mainly of software produced 
in-house, in which case it will be recorded as assets rather than as consumption of inputs from 
other sectors. 
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As a result, investment in software and databases would be mainly the result of in-house 
production, whose capital asset value (recorded as GFCF) is determined by the companies 
themselves. Should we conclude that GFCF is overvalued? This is a legitimate question. It calls for 
more specific investigation by investor and consumer sectors in order to assess the extent of 
overvaluation relative to economies comparable to France. 
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